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Introduction
In 1976, Congress overhauled American copyright law by passing
the 1976 Copyright Act (1976 Act).' Central to the 1976 Act is the
broadened legal protection afforded copyright owners for public perform-
ances of musical compositions.2 Under the 1976 Act, copyright owners
of musical compositions 3 have the exclusive right to authorize, and are
entitled to compensation for, public performances of their songs by
means such as radio, audiotape, or compact disc.' In granting expanded
protection to copyright owners, however, Congress carved out certain
exemptions in the 1976 Act,' the most troublesome of which is section
110(5).6
In essence, section 110(5) denies compensation to copyright owners
for public transmissions made on standard radio or television equipment,
such as a stereo receiver, that is comparable to equipment used in private
homes.7 Hence, the small business owner who listens to his portable ra-
dio during business hours need not pay copyright licensing fees to every
musician featured on the radio, even though members of the general pub-
lic hear the radio while inside the business establishment.
Despite the appeal of shielding the casual radio listener from copy-
right liability, the language of the section 110(5)8 exemption is extremely
imprecise. Consequently, section 110(5) has generated an ongoing
stream of litigation and a body of case law that is, at best, muddled.
This note examines the origin, content, and legislative history of the
section 110(5) exemption to the 1976 Act. It then analyzes the inconsis-
tent and unpredictable case law generated by the section 110(5) exemp-
tion. The note concludes by offering solutions that, if adopted, should
make section 110(5) litigation less frequent and the results less arbitrary.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-553, title I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
2. See Copyright Law: Performance Rights in Musical Compositions and Videocassette
Recordings, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress No. 89-639A, at 2-3 (Nov. 2,
1989) [hereinafter Service Report].
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
4. See id. § 101 (definition of a "public performance").
5. See id. §§ 107-18.
6. See id. § 110(5).
7. Id.
8. See id.; Laura A. Misner, Note, Copyright Liability for Performances of Musical
Works: Use of Background Radio Music in the Aftermath of Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 245, 249 (1986).
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I
The History of Section 110(5)
A. The Aiken Decision and the 1976 Copyright Act
Throughout much of the twentieth century, copyright law was gov-
erned by the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act).9 Under the 1909 Act,
copyright owners were entitled to compensation for "public perform-
ances" of their work."° The 1909 Act required three elements to show
that a public performance had occurred: 1) the rendition needed to be a
performance; 2) the performance needed to be a public performance; and
3) the public performance needed to occur for profit."1 Only when all
three elements were satisfied were copyright owners entitled to enforce
their exclusive right to public performances of their work. This law re-
mained largely unchanged until Congress passed the Copyright Act of
1976.
In the 1975 case of Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 2 the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether, under the 1909 Act, an
infringement occurred when a small business establishment played back-
ground radio music during business hours.13 The Court's answer was
that, under the factual circumstances presented, playing background ra-
dio music in a small business did not amount to a public performance of
copyrighted works.4
In Aiken, the defendant owned a small fast-food chicken restaurant
("George Aiken's Chicken") in which he played radio music for his cus-
tomers and employees.I5 Aiken had connected the radio to four speakers
mounted on the restaurant ceiling. 16 The radio played throughout each
day, broadcasting music and other normal programming.1 7 One day,
during business hours, two of the plaintiffs' copyrighted songs were
played on the radio. 8 Although the radio station that broadcast the mu-
sic had obtained a license from the American Society of Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers (ASCAP) to perform the musical works, Aiken had
9. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (amending and consolidating the
Acts respecting copyright) (supplanted by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
10. 17 U.S.C. § l(c)-(e) (1970) (1909 Act).
11. See David E. Shipley, Copyright Law and Your Neighborhood Bar and Grill: Recent
Developments in Performance Rights and the Section 110(5) Exemption, 29 ARiz. L. REV. 475,
477-83 (1987); See also Service Report, supra note 2, at 2.
12. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
13. Id. at 157.
14. Id. at 162-64.
15. Id. at 152.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 152-53.
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not.' 9 The plaintiffs, both of whom were ASCAP members, sued Aiken
for copyright infringement on the ground that Aiken had failed to obtain
a license from ASCAP before playing their songs on the radio at George
Aiken's Chicken.2°
The Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs' argument and held that
Aiken had not "performed" copyrighted songs by playing the radio.2'
The Court's holding had two bases. First, the Court drew an analogy
22
with two prior decisions23 in which it held that cable television system
operators did not "perform" copyrighted programs by receiving and re-
transmitting broadcasts of television programs. The Court reasoned that
if sophisticated television retransmission is not a performance, then
surely no performance took place when Aiken played his simple radio.24
Second, the Court warned of the "practical unenforceability" of a rule
holding countless small business establishments liable for copyright in-
fringement whenever they turn on a radio or television set.25 Thus, the
Court had seemingly removed any uncertainty surrounding transmis-
sions of radio music in small public establishments by deeming them
nonperformances.
In 1976, just one year after the Supreme Court decided Aiken, Con-
gress thoroughly revised the 1909 Act by enacting the 1976 Copyright
Act.26 As part of the 1976 Act, Congress rejected the definition of "per-
formance" set forth in Aiken 27 and extended copyright protection to sec-
ondary transmissions such as radio music.
2 s
According to the 1976 Act, "[to] 'perform' a work means to recite,
render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or
process . ".. 29 This more expansive definition of "perform" was ex-
plained in a House of Representatives Committee Report:
Under the definitions.., the concepts of public performance ... cover
not only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further act by
which that rendition or showing is transmitted or communicated to the
public. Thus, for example: ... any individual is performing whenever
19. Id. at 153.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 161-64.
22. Id. at 160-62.
23. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fort-
nightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 402 (1968).
24. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162.
25. Id. at 162.
26. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914.
27. Id. § 101.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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he or she plays a phonorecord embodying the performance or com-
municates the performance by turning on a receiving set.
30
Thus, under the 1976 Act, those who communicate songs to others
by playing a portable radio are in fact "performing" those songs. This
does not mean, as one commentator has noted, that individuals playing
radios in their homes or singing copyrighted lyrics in the shower are sub-
ject to control by copyright owners.31 The 1976 Act further requires that
a "performance" be "public" to trigger copyright protection. 32 The 1976
Act defines "public" performance of a work as follows:
(1) to perform... it at a place open to the public or at any place where
a substantial number of persons outside a normal circle of a family and
its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance .. .of the
work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiv-
ing the performance . . .receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times.
3
Thus, the concept of "public" under the 1976 Act includes all but
the most private performances. Under this broadened definition, the
facts of Aiken unquestionably amounted to a public performance because
the transmission occurred in a public restaurant. Consequently, the new
definition of public performance in the 1976 Act overturned the primary
legal basis of the Aiken decision.
B. The Section 110(5) Exemption
Despite overturning the Aiken definition of public performance,
Congress explicitly preserved the result of Aiken under the 1976 Act in
section 110(5). 31 Section 110(5) addresses the issue of whether small
commercial establishments, such as Aiken's fast-food restaurant, infringe
copyrights when they play the radio during business hours.35 Section
110(5) exempts from copyright liability:
[C]ommunication[s] of a transmission 36 embodying a performance or
display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a sin-
gle receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes,
unless-
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
30. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5676-77 (emphasis added).
31. Shipley, supra note 11, at 484.
32. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4) & 101 (definition of "to perform publicly").
33. Id. § 101 (emphasis added).
34. Id. § 110(5); H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5); H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30; Shipley, supra note 11, at 484.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines the concept of a "transmission program" as a body of material
that, as an aggregate, has been produced for the sole purpose of transmission to the public in
sequence and as a unit.
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(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the
public.
37
Thus, section 110(5) exempts from copyright liability the public re-
ception of radio transmissions on standard, home-quality receiving
equipment. As the legislative history explains:
[T]he clause would exempt small commercial establishments whose
proprietors merely bring onto their premises standard radio or televi-
sion equipment and turn it on for their customers' enjoyment, but it
would impose liability where the proprietor has a commercial "sound
system" installed or converts a standard home receiving apparatus (by
augmenting it with sophisticated or extensive amplification equipment)
into the equivalent of a commercial sound system.38
The "single receiving apparatus ' 39 limitation of section 110(5) ap-
parently limits the exemption to radio and television equipment.' Thus,
the use of a compact disc player or cassette recorder in a small commer-
cial establishment is unprotected by section 110(5). 4 1 Moreover, any
sound system deemed more complex or extensive than sound equipment
used for normal home use is not exempt.42
Congress no doubt intended section 110(5), at the least, to protect
small businesses who play simple radios during business hours.43 It is
unclear, however, whether Congress meant to limit the exemption to
small businesses only. Section 1tO(5) is silent on the issue. It is therefore
worthwhile to explore the exemption's legislative history.
C. Section 110(5)'s Legislative History
A version of section 110(5), passed by the Senate in 1974, permitted
the use of ordinary radios and televisions for the incidental entertainment
of customers at certain small businesses, such as taverns, dry cleaners,
and doctors' offices. 4 When the Senate repassed the bill in 1976, how-
ever, the Senate committee report disapprovingly acknowledged the in-
tervening 1975 Aiken decision. 45  The Senate report noted that the
exemption would not apply where broadcasts are transmitted by means of
loudspeakers or similar devices in such establishments as bus terminals,
37. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
38. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
40. Service Report, supra note 2.
41. See Service Report, supra note 2.
42. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30.
43. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324, 1333 (N.D. Ill.
1990), ajfd, 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991).
44. S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1974);
Shipley, supra note 11, at 487.
45. 122 CONG. Rac. S1546 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1976).
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factories, department stores, hotels, and quick service food establishments
of the type involved in Aiken.46
By contrast, the House approvingly acknowledged the Aiken deci-
sion when passing its version of the section 110(5) exemption.47 The
House report explained that, although the House bill rejected the Aiken
definition of performance and therefore overturned the legal basis for the
Aiken holding,4" the section 110(5) exemption would nevertheless apply
to the factual situation presented in Aiken. 49 The House report noted,
however, that the facts of Aiken present the exemption's outer bound-
ary.50 According to the House report:
Under the particular fact situation in the Aiken case, assuming a small
commercial establishment and the use of a home receiver with four
ordinary loudspeakers grouped within a relatively narrow circumfer-
ence from the set, it is intended that the performance would be exempt
under [section 110](5). However, the Committee considers this fact sit-
uation to represent the outer limit of the exemption and believes that
the line should be drawn at that point.51
The House report then listed several factors for courts to consider in
determining whether particular sound systems qualify for the exemption,
including the "size, physical arrangement, and noise level of the areas...
where the transmissions are made audible or visible."52
When the House and Senate met in conference committee to resolve
their differences over the section 110(5) exemption, the Senate accepted
the "essence" of the House report. 3 The conference report produced the
following statement of intent:
It is the intent of the conferees that a small commercial establishment
of the type involved in [Aiken], which merely augmented a home-type
receiver and which was not of sufficient size to justify, as a practical
matter, a subscription to a commercial background music service,
would be exempt. However, where the public communication was by
means of something other than a home-type receiving apparatus, or
where the establishment actually makes a further transmission to the
public, the exemption would not apply.
54
Thus, Congress expressed its intent that small commercial establish-
ments using unsophisticated receiving equipment be exempt from copy-
right infringement liability for public performances of musical works.
46. Id.; see also ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW (6th ed., 1986); Shipley, supra
note 11, at 487.
47. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Shipley, supra note 11, at 488.
54. H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976).
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Yet, like section 110(5) itself, the conference report lacks precision.
Terms such as "home-type receiver" and "small commercial establish-
ment" are left undefined. Further, the conference report essentially
states that the facts of Aiken would qualify for the exemption." It is
unclear, however, which particular facts in Aiken are most significant or
how courts should resolve mixed cases in which some facts (such as the
size of the business) are more extreme than Aiken, while others (such as
the number of speakers) are less extreme. Finally, both the language and
the legislative history of section 110(5) are ambiguous as to what specific
policy the exemption is designed to achieve.
D. Three Policy Grounds for Section 110(5)
Section 110(5) seems to rest on at least three related but distinct
policy grounds, only one of which is expressed clearly in the statute itself.
1. Small Business Rationale
One recurring theme in both the House Committee Report5 6 and the
Conference Report57 is that section 110(5) applies to "small commercial
establishments." A plausible explanation for such language is Congress'
desire to spare small businesses the trouble and expense of obtaining a
license for playing a simple radio or television. Congress' concern for
protecting small businesses is apparent in its assertion that Aiken should
represent the "outer limit" of the exemption.5 8 Further, the House Com-
mittee Report lists size as a significant factor in the section 110(5) analy-
sis.59 Nothing in the actual language of the statute, however, refers to
the size of the business.
2. Nature of Equipment Rationale
Of the policy objectives underlying section 110(5), only Congress'
reluctance to exempt sophisticated commercial sound systems is made
explicit in the statute. Section 110(5) specifically limits the exemption to
"the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus
of a kind commonly used in private homes." 60 Implicit in this provision
may be an assumption by Congress that small businesses are unlikely
owners of sophisticated sound systems. Thus, it is possible to view Con-
55. Id.
56. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30.
57. H.R. REP. No. 1733.
58. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30; H.R. REP. No. 1733, supra note 54.
59. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
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gress' decision to limit the section 110(5) exception to home-type equip-
ment as a means of protecting small businesses.
Yet, there is no inherent reason to assume small businesses will
never have sophisticated sound systems or that large establishments will
never use home-type equipment. For example, it is easy to imagine the
snack bar or shoe department of a five-story department store playing a
portable radio. By contrast, a small stereo shop might find it advanta-
geous to install highly sophisticated audio equipment. Moreover, even if
small businesses are often less able to afford sophisticated equipment,
some surely can. Consequently, section 110(5) does not, on its face, draw
a firm distinction between small and large businesses, by size or revenue,
when it limits the exemption to "a single receiving apparatus of a kind
commonly used in private homes."
61
3. Impracticality of Enforcement Rationale
A third rationale for the section 110(5) exception lies within the
Aiken decision. 62 Although Congress rejected the definition of "public
performance" set forth in Aiken,63 the additional basis for the Aiken
holding-that it would be impractical to hold countless businesses liable
for copyright infringement-was never explicitly discarded. It is possi-
ble, therefore, that Congress viewed the impracticality of enforcement as
an additional reason for creating the section 110(5) exemption.
Again, it is arguable that the impracticality of enforcing copyright
protection for radio transmissions is especially applicable to small busi-
nesses. Yet it is similarly impractical to monitor every department in a
large department store. Hence, the impracticality of enforcement ration-
ale provides no clear basis for limiting the section 110(5) exemption to
small businesses.
Thus, at least three possible objectives support the section 110(5)
exemption. However, only one of the possible objectives-Congress' de-
sire not to exempt sophisticated sound systems-is explicit in the lan-
guage of the statute.65 Of the other two objectives-protecting small
businesses and avoiding problems of enforcement-the small business ra-
tionale is found only in the exemption's legislative history,66 and the
practicality of enforcement rationale is explicit only in the Aiken deci-
sion.67 In short, nothing in the actual language of section 110(5) confines
61. Id.
62. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
63. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30.
64. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
66. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30; H.R. REP. No. 1733, supra note 54.
67. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 164.
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the exemption to small businesses. Any such limitation must therefore
come from the statement of congressional intent contained in the House
Committee Report or the Conference Report.68
Predictably, multiple explanations of Congress' objectives, com-
bined with the vague wording of section 110(5), produced unpredictable
results in the courts.
II
Litigation of Section 110(5)
From its inception, the section 110(5) exemption generated an ongo-
ing stream of litigation.69 In interpreting section 110(5), courts have
struggled to determine both the terms of the exemption and the signifi-
cance of the legislative history,7 ° with conflicting results. Much of the
confusion stems from the fact that some courts have read the statute
literally,7" while others have relied on legislative history to add addi-
tional requirements into the exemption.72
A literal reading of section 110(5) produces the following three-part
test73 for determining when the exemption applies: (1) the establishment
must use a single receiving apparatus; (2) the receiving apparatus is of a
kind commonly used in private homes; and (3) the establishment does
not further transmit to the public the transmissions it receives.74 Some
courts have added a fourth element, however, by requiring that the ex-
empted business be a small commercial establishment.7 5 This fourth ele-
ment reflects statements in the legislative history-rather than the statute
itself-that Congress intended to "exempt small commercial establish-
ments of the type involved in [Aiken]. ' 76
Such discrepancies suggest courts are emphasizing different ratio-
nales for the section 110(5) exemption. Because the terms of the statute
68. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30; H.R. REP. No. 1733, supra note 54.
69. Shipley, supra note 11, at 489.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991);
Edison Bros. Stores v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir. 1992).
72. See, e.g., Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990);
International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988).
73. This three-part test is based on the assumption that no direct charge is made to see or
hear the transmission in violation of § 1 10(5)(A).
74. See, e.g., Claire's Boutiques, 754 F. Supp. at 1328; Edison Bros. Stores v. Broadcast
Music, Inc., 760 F. Supp. at 770.
75. See, e.g., Hickory Grove Music, 749 F. Supp. at 1037; International Korwin, 855 F.2d
at 378.
76. H.R. REP. No. 1733, supra note 54. Moreover, several decisions focus on the size of
the business without formally adding the size of the establishment as an additional element.
See, e.g., Hickory Grove Music, 749 F. Supp. at 1037; International Korwin, 855 F.2d at 378.
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say nothing about the size of the establishment, 77 courts that rely on the
legislative history to add size as a central consideration 7 seemingly
adopt the protection of small businesses as the central aim of the statute.
By contrast, courts following a literal reading of section 1 10(5)-and
thereby not considering size as an essential element-apparently empha-
size Congress' desire not to exempt sophisticated sound equipment.
A. The Small Business Rationale and the "Small Business Establishment"
Test
Cases viewing section 110(5) primarily as a means of protecting
small business 79 usually focus on the size of the establishment, the reve-
nues of the establishment, or both.
One of the first cases to consider size as central to section 110(5) was
Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc. 80 Gap Stores operates a well-known
chain of retail clothing stores (The Gap). In Gap Stores, the plaintiffs
brought suit against The Gap for playing copyrighted material over the
radio in two New York City stores.81 Both stores used receivers con-
nected to several speakers recessed in their ceilings, and the music played
on the systems was audible throughout the stores.8 2 One store was 2,769
square feet in size; the other was 6,770 square feet.8 3 The average size of
all Gap stores was 3,500 square feet.8 4
After quoting extensively from the House Committee Report,8 5 the
district court noted that "The Gap stores, with an average size of 3500
square feet, are substantially larger than the public area of 620 square
feet in the fast-food store at issue in Aiken. ' ' 6 The district court further
explained that "[b]y virtue of the size of The Gap stores, the radio trans-
missions... played via the recessed loudspeakers are 'further transmitted
to the public.' ",87 The court then held that The Gap is not the small
commercial establishment Congress intended to exempt from copyright
77. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
78. See, e.g., Hickory Grove Music, 749 F. Supp. at 1037; International Korwin, 855 F.2d
at 378.
79. See, e.g., Hickory Grove Music, 749 F. Supp. at 1031; International Korwin, 855 F.2d
at 378; Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981); Bob Merrill v. Bill
Miller's Bar-B-Q Enters., 688 F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Bob Merrill v. County Stores,
Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1164 (D.N.H. 1987); Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 617 F. Supp.
1021 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
80. 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981).
81. Id. at 923-24.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30.
86. 516 F. Supp. at 925.
87. Id.
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liability.88 Thus, the court used the size of the establishment as evidence
that The Gap had further transmitted radio transmissions to the public
in violation of section 110(5)(b).
The Second Circuit affirmed, 9 noting that, "The Gap store . . . is
much larger than the shop in Aiken which ... indicates that Congress
did not intend it to be exempted... pursuant to § 110(5). '"90 The Second
Circuit did not specifically indicate, however, whether the size of The
Gap stores merely served as evidence of "further transmission to the pub-
lic" as proscribed by section 110(5), or whether it was implying that all
establishments larger than the one in Aiken (620 square feet) would auto-
matically fail to meet the exemption.
Seven years later, in International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 9 an
Illinois district court took Gap Stores a step further by explicitly estab-
lishing-as an independent requirement of section 110(5)-that the busi-
ness be "the type of small commercial establishment protected by the
exemption. '9 2 In International Korwin, the plaintiff copyright owners
sued a Chicago restaurant owner for playing copyrighted works.9 3 The
restaurant contained 2,664 square feet of space open to the public and sat
approximately 200 persons.9 4 Radio music played throughout the restau-
rant from a receiver connected to eight speakers mounted in the ceiling.95
Although the court refused to exempt the restaurant on several
grounds,9 6 it found the sheer size of the restaurant independently suffi-
cient to preclude exemption under section 110(5). 9" As the court ex-
plained, "[w]ith 2,640 square feet of space, the [restaurant] is more than
four times the size of the small fast food store in Aiken and hence too
large an establishment to qualify under § 110(5)."" 8
Thus, whereas Gap Stores used size as evidence of a further trans-
mission, International Korwin explicitly established small size as an in-
dependent requirement of section 110(5). 99  The Seventh Circuit
88. Id.
89. Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981).
90. Id. at 86.
91. 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. I1. 1987), affid, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988).
92. Id. at 658.
93. Id. at 654.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 657. The court found the equipment too sophisticated to qualify under § 110(5)
as a "single receiving apparatus commonly used in private homes." Additionally, the court
held the restaurant "further transmitted to the public" in violation of § 110(5). Id.
97. Id. at 658.
98. Id.
99. While the district court in International Korwin determined that the restaurant had
"further transmitted to the public," it never mentioned the size of the restaurant as a factor in
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affirmed,"° acknowledging that the district court interpreted section
110(5) to require "small commercial establishment" as an independent
test for applying the exemption. 10 1
Two years later, in Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews,102 a Montana
district court followed International Korwin in holding that section
110(5) applies only to small commercial establishments.10 3 In Hickory
Grove Music, copyright owners brought suit against the owners of a res-
taurant in Billings, Montana. The restaurant at issue seated 120 persons
with a gross seating area of 1,192 square feet."° Radio music played
throughout portions of the restaurant"0 5 over five recessed ceiling speak-
ers, which were originally wired for a public address system."16
The court noted that in determining when section 110(5) applies,
"courts now require [that] the business must be a small commercial estab-
lishment."' °7 The court further explained that three factors determine
whether a restaurant qualifies as a small commercial establishment: the
restaurant's square footage, capacity, and business revenues.1
0 8
Turning to the facts before it, the court addressed the defendants'
contention that their sound system covered only 880 square feet' 09-ess
than one third the size of the establishments in either International Kor-
win or Gap Stores. The court held that "even this 880 square foot area
exceeds the public area in Aiken. On this basis alone, defendants have
failed to show their restaurant is a 'small commercial establishment' as
contemplated by the § 110(5) exemption. "0 Thus, in addition to using
small size as an absolute requirement of section 110(5), the court in Hick-
ory Grove Music strongly implied that any establishment larger than the
one in Aiken would not qualify for the exemption."'
deciding that a further transmission occurred. Instead, the court found a further transmission
purely on the basis that the receiver and speakers were located in different rooms. Id. at 657.
100. International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988).
101. Id. at 378.
102. Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990).
103. Id. at 1037.
104. Id. at 1034.
105. Id.
106. Id. The use of a sound system originally installed as a public announcement system
served as an additional basis for denying protection under § 110(5) because such systems are
not of the type commonly used in private homes. Id. at 1038.
107. Id. at 1037 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 1038.
109. Id. at 1039.
110. Id.
111. Several other cases also consider size an important factor in determining whether
§ 110(5) applies to particular businesses. See, e.g., Bob Merrill v. County Stores, Inc., 669 F.
Supp. 1164, 1170 (D.N.H. 1987) (13,000 square foot hardware store too large to qualify under
§ 110(5)); Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 617 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (W.D. Pa. 1985)
(10,000 square foot lumber company too large to qualify for.§ 110(5)); Bob Merrill v. Bill
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In addition to considering floorspace, courts sometimes evaluate the
revenues of a business to determine whether a business is a "small com-
mercial establishment."' I 2 Of the opinions finding business revenues sig-
nificant, virtually all rely on language in the Conference Report
expressing the conferees' intent to exempt "a small commercial establish-
ment of the type involved in [Aiken], . . . which was not of sufficient size
to justify, as a practical matter, a subscription to a commercial back-
ground music service." 1 3 For example, in Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-
Q Enterprises,"' a Texas district court refused to apply the section 110(5)
exemption to a chain of fast-food restaurants where each restaurant
grossed over $500,000 annually. 5 The court, after quoting from the
Conference Report, found it "clearly practical" for such a chain to sub-
scribe to a background music service."1 6
Similarly, the court in International Korwin117 found it significant
that the restaurant at issue generated enough revenue (between $583,000
and $919,000 annually) to justify the use of a commercial background
music service."1 8 And in Hickory Grove Music, 9 the court held that,
along with square footage and seating capacity, revenue was a central
factor in deciding whether a business is a "small commercial establish-
ment" for the purposes of section 110(5).120 Thus, where courts limit
section 110(5) to small commercial establishments, revenues provide an
additional basis for denying the exemption.
In at least one case, however, low revenue served as a basis for ap-
plying the section 110(5) exemption under most unlikely circumstances.
In Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc. ,12t several plaintiffs (including
singer/songwriter Bruce Springsteen) sued the owner of an outdoor mini-
ature golf course for playing copyrighted songs over the radio.' 22 The
sound system at the miniature golf course consisted of a radio receiver
Miller's Bar-B-Q Enters., 688 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (chain of 1,000-1,500
square foot restaurants not entitled to § 110(5) protection).
112. See, e.g., Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q, 688 F. Supp. at 1176; International Korwin Corp. v.
Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652, 658 (N.D. 11. 1987), affld, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988); Sailor
Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 923, 926 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981);
Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113, 1118 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
113. H.R. REP. No. 1733, supra note 54.
114. 688 F. Supp. at 1172.
115. Id. at 1176.
116. Id.
117. 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Il. 1987), af'd, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988).
118. Id.
119. Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990).
120. Id. at 1038.
121. 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
122. Id. at 1114.
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wired to six separate speakers, mounted on light poles throughout the
7,500 square foot course.
123
Acknowledging that the defendant's miniature golf course was over
ten times the size of the restaurant in Aiken,124 the court in Plaza Roller
Dome nevertheless contended that "[t]he size of the ... facility and the
number of speakers are not ... the sole or even predominant factors to
consider in determining the applicability of the exemption."' 25 The
court noted familiar language in the Conference Report expressing Con-
gressional intent to exempt businesses too small to justify subscribing to a
commercial background music service.1 26 The court argued, however,
that despite its size, the defendant's Putt-Putt course was open only six
months per year and rarely generated over $1,000 per month. 27 "[I]f
any operation is 'not of sufficient size to justify ... a commercial back-
ground music service,'" the court proclaimed, "it is [d]efendant's Putt-
Putt course."'' 28 Hence, the low revenues of the Putt-Putt course made it
a "small business establishment" within the scope of section 110(5), de-
spite its large physical size.'
29
B. Rejection of the "Small Business Establishment" Test
The "small business establishment" requirement has been roundly
criticized in two recent opinions.' 30 Both decisions argue that Section
110(5) is silent as to the size of the businesses to which it applies. Conse-
quently, the use of size and revenues as determinative factors improperly
supplements the actual terms of Section 110(5) with language from the
statute's legislative history. '3'
The first explicit rejection of the "small business establishment" re-
quirement came in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc.' 3 2 In
Claire's Boutiques, copyright owners sued Claire's Boutiques retail stores
for copyright infringement.1 33 Claire's Boutiques owned and operated
721 stores under the name Claire's Boutiques. These stores ranged in
size from 458 square feet to 2,000 square feet, with an average size of 861
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1117.
125. Id. at 1117-18.
126. Id. at 1118.
127. Id. at 1119.
128. Id. at 1118-19.
129. Id.
130. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ill. 1990),
aff'd, 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991); Edison Bros. Stores v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 767 (E.D. Mo. 1991), affid, 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir. 1992).
131. Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1491; Edison Bros., 954 F.2d at 1423.
132. 754 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ill. 1990), affid, 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991).
133. Id. at 1326.
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square feet.' 34 Additionally, Claire's Boutiques owned thirty stores
under the name Arcadia, the average size of which was 2,022 square
feet.'35 Claire's Boutiques' net sales in 1990 exceeded $160,000,000.136
As a general rule, Claire's Boutiques provided each of its stores with a
stereo receiver and two speakers. 3 7 At one time, twenty-four Claire's
Boutiques-and all thirty Arcadia stores before they were purchased by
Claire's Boutiques-subscribed to a commercial background music ser-
vice on a trial basis.'3 8 Claire's Boutiques ended the trial subscription,
however, because its employees preferred listening to the radio.1
39
The Illinois district court held that Claire's Boutiques qualified for
the section 110(5) exemption, despite the size and profitability of its retail
chain. , The court flatly refused to evaluate either size or revenues in
applying section 110(5). 141 Acknowledging that several courts have con-
sidered size and revenue important, if not dispositive, the court argued
that those decisions wrongly inferred additional elements from the legis-
lative history.'42 The court reasoned that:
[A]lthough the legislative history may ... help a court discover the
statute's meaning, it may not be used to change it.... The text of...
§ 110(5) includes nothing at all about the size of a business, the area
that it covers, or the revenue that it generates. Certainly the legislative
history may be useful in terms of interpreting such factors as "further
transmission" and "single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly
used in private homes." It may not, however, be used to supply addi-
tional elements beyond those specified in the statute. 143
The court then concluded from the legislative history that Congress
clearly intended to exempt small businesses, but not on the basis of size
or revenue.'44 Instead, the court argued, Congress chose to effectuate its
intent by drawing distinctions based on the type of sound equipment used
and the nature of the transmission. 45 Since neither the defendant's
equipment nor its transmissions violated the text of section 110(5), the
court ruled in favor of Claire's Boutiques regardless of its size and
revenue. 1
46
134. Id. at 1325.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1334.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1333.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1336.
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The Seventh Circuit affirmed.147 Like the district court, the appel-
late court noted that "[l]egislative history cannot be used to invent rules
totally unrelated to the language of the statute." 148 The court held that,
notwithstanding the conclusions of other courts, Claire's Boutiques' size
and profitability were "not relevant under § 110(5)."'"9 Thus, in une-
quivocal terms, the Seventh Circuit discarded the "small commercial es-
tablishment" requirement as irrelevant to the section 110(5) analysis.
A Missouri district court reached a similar conclusion in Edison
Bros. Stores v. Broadcast Music, Inc. 150 Edison Bros. involved a chain of
approximately 2,500 shoe stores ("Edison"), ranging in size from approx-
imately 850 to 1,200 square feet of selling space." 1 Like the defendant in
Claire's Boutiques, Edison provided each store with a radio receiver unit
and two speakers. 152 Further, Edison forbade its employees from playing
anything besides the radio in the stores. 15 3 To avoid copyright infringe-
ment liability, Edison sued for a declaratory judgment that its radio pol-
icy fell within the protection of section 110(5).154
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) challenged Edison's conduct, partially
on the ground that Edison's size and annual revenues disqualified Edison
from section 110(5) protection. The court disposed of BMI's argument
by noting that "the criteria BMI stresses are nowhere to be found in the
[statute], and [the court] doubts the necessity to look beyond the clear
terms of the statute to find hidden requirements in the legislative his-
tory." '155 The court further concluded that "[iut is clear from the statu-
tory language of [section 110(5)] that Congress chose to focus on the type
of equipment and the manner in which it is used, and not on the size or
financial strength of the business .... 156 The court then approved of
the reasoning in Claire's Boutiques and held that neither the size nor the
financial strength of Edison disqualified it from the section 110(5)
exception. 157
In a strongly worded opinion, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district
court's holding."5 ' Responding to BMI's argument that Edison was not
a small business establishment, the court accused BMI of asking the
147. 949 F.2d 1482, 1496 (7th Cir. 1991).
148. Id. at 1491.
149. Id. at 1492.
150. 760 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir. 1992).
151. Id. at 768.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 771.
156. Id. at 772.
157. Id.
158. 954 F.2d 1419, 1425 (8th Cir. 1992).
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judges to "use legislative history to rewrite the section 110(5) exemption
to add new requirements."' 59 As for BMI's argument that the square
footage of Edison's stores exceeded the bounds of section 110(5), the
court offered the following response:
Although the legislative history is interesting, it is beside the point; we
need only look to the statute itself. If Congress intended to impose a
physical size limitation on the establishment qualifying for the exemp-
tion, it might easily have written it into the statute .... The statute
focuses on the equipment being used, and so must we. This Court is
not a legislative body, and it has no authority to rewrite the statute.' 60
The Eighth Circuit extended an equally hostile reception to BMI's
argument that a chain store the size of Edison could surely afford a back-
ground music service:
The intent expressed in the report of the House conferees is irrelevant
when the statutory language does not say or even imply that the size or
financial wherewithal of the establishment has a bearing on eligibility
for the [section 110(5)] exemption .... [T]he opinions of other courts
that mention this language do not persuade us that, even though Con-
gress enacted the law without any such requirement, it truly intended a
size-and-financial means test to be a part of the statute.'
6
Thus, the courts in both Claire's Boutiques and Edison Bros. emphati-
cally reject the "small commercial establishment" requirement set forth
in earlier cases. 162 In so doing, both cases implicitly abandon the notion
that section 110(5) was intended solely to benefit small business. Instead,
by giving the statute a literal reading, both cases apparently adopt the
view that Congress was primarily concerned with exempting unsophisti-
cated transmission equipment in settings where music is not transmitted
to the public. Although Congress might have believed such a limitation
would benefit small businesses primarily, nothing in the terms of section
110(5) suggests the exemption applies exclusively to small businesses. A
corollary implication of such a view is that even the largest chain stores
will qualify for the section 110(5) exemption, provided each store in the
chain meets the statutory requirements. In fact, both Claire's Boutiques
and Edison Bros. reached precisely that conclusion in applying section
110(5) to chain stores.
163
At least two circuits have rejected the "small business establish-
ment" requirement. In other circuits, however, the section 110(5) ex-
emption apparently remains available only to small businesses.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1424.
161. Id. at 1425.
162. See generally section II.A., supra.
163. Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1490; Edison Bros., 954 F.2d at 1425.
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III
Making Sense of Section 110(5)'s Ambiguous Terms
Even when courts focus on the literal terms of section 110(5), the
results are erratic. The statute, by its terms, applies only to transmissions
made on a "single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in pri-
vate homes." ' 4 Moreover, the exemption is lost when the transmission
is "further transmitted to the public." '165 The statute provides no indica-
tion, however, as to what defines a "single receiving apparatus of a kind
commonly used in a private home," nor does it describe a "further
[transmission] to the public." '166
The legislative history of section 110(5) offers some guidance as to
what Congress meant by such terms, although with little precision. The
House Committee Report instructs courts to consider the size, physical
arrangement, and noise level of the areas in which transmissions are au-
dible, and the extent to which the receiving apparatus is altered or aug-
mented for the purpose of improving the performance.
1 67
The Committee Report sheds no light on the relative weight ac-
corded each factor, nor does it indicate whether the factors it lists are
exhaustive in applying the exemption. Not surprisingly, courts have
given different weight to each factor listed in the Committee Report, with
confusing results.
Based on the Committee Report language, litigation over the availa-
bility of the section 110(5) exemption most often centers on some or all of
the following factual issues: (1) whether equipment has been modified;
(2) whether the speakers are hidden and/or the receiver and speakers are
connected by concealed wiring; (3) the number of speakers; (4) the sepa-
ration of the receiver and speakers; and (5) the quality of the speakers
and/or sound. Each factor is addressed below.
A. Modification of Equipment
The only factor on which the courts agree is that excessive modifica-
tion of equipment converts home-type equipment into a commercial
sound system. Virtually all courts addressing the issue have found modi-
fication of equipment highly relevant in deciding whether a sound system
is a "single receiving apparatus" of the type "commonly used in a private
home." In particular, business owners who have integrated radio sys-
tems into large public address systems have failed to qualify for the sec-
164. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 30.
19931 COPYRIGHTS AND BACKGROUND MUSIC
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
tion 110(5) exemption. For example, in Merrill v. County Stores, Inc. ,6'
a hardware store that connected its radio into a fourteen-speaker public
address system failed the exemption because the store did not use a "sin-
gle receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes.'
' 69
B. Hidden Speakers and/or Speakers and Receiver Connected via
Concealed Wiring
The significance of concealed wiring under section 110(5) is less
clear. The issue is whether or not placing speakers and/or speaker wire
behind a wall, rather than leaving them open and exposed, disqualifies a
sound system from the exemption. Courts simply disagree over the im-
portance of concealed wiring in determining that a sound system is not
home-type equipment.
In Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 7° a Montana district court re-
fused to apply the section 110(5) exemption to a restaurant with recessed
ceiling speakers and hidden wiring, despite the defendants' contention
that both features were common in home sound systems. The court
reasoned:
Although the sound system ... was installed by an amateur and does
not provide optimal sound, this Court and the case law both disagree
with defendant's contention that this is a "home-type" system. Nu-
merous courts have found that recessed ceiling speakers attached to a
receiving apparatus by a substantial length of hidden wiring do not
constitute "home-type" systems.
1 71
Several other cases have likewise refused to apply the exemption
where the receiver and speakers were connected with concealed
wiring. 172
One recent decision, however, casts doubt on the conclusion that
concealed wiring makes a sound system commercial. 73 In Claire's Bou-
tiques,'74 an Illinois district court rejected both ceiling speakers and con-
168. 669 F. Supp. 1164 (D.N.H. 1987).
169. Id. at 1170. See also Crabshaw v. K-Bobs of El Paso, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 763 (W.D.
Tex. 1990) (restaurant playing radio over lI -speaker public address system ineligible for
exemption).
170. 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990).
171. Id. at 1038.
172. See, e.g., International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ill.
1987), affid, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988) (recessed ceiling speakers and concealed wiring are
not common in private homes); Bob Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enters., 688 F. Supp. 1172
(W.D. Tex. 1988) (ceiling speakers separated from receiver by 40 feet of hidden wiring are not
a. home-type system); Gnossos Music v. DiPompo, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539 (D. Me. 1989)
(portable stereo connected to eight ceiling speakers is a commercial sound system).
173. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ill. 1990),
affid, 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991).
174. Id.
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cealed wiring as determinative factors in defining a system as home-type
or commercial.175 The court found it naive to suggest that speaker wires
in private homes are generally short and exposed.1 76 Moreover, argued
the court, the purpose of concealing speaker wires and recessing the
speakers in a ceiling is aesthetic and has little relevance to the sophistica-
tion of the sound system. 177 The court then found the simplicity of the
equipment controlling,1 7 ' and applied the exemption despite the defend-
ant's use of concealed wiring and ceiling-mounted speakers.179
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed, 8 ° noting that "the hiding of
the wire and of the speakers is only marginally relevant to [the section
110(5)] analysis."18 Thus, at least one circuit has downgraded the im-
portance of hidden speakers and speaker wire. It remains unclear
whether other circuits will follow.
C. Number of Speakers
Most courts agree that the use of a large number of speakers indi-
cates that a sound system is commercial in nature. What remains un-
clear, however, is how many speakers the exemption allows. In Rodgers
v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 8' for example, a Pennsylvania district court
denied the section 110(5) exemption to a lumber company in part be-
cause its radio system used between three and eight separate speakers.
18 3
By contrast, in Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome Inc., 184 a district
court in North Carolina held that six speakers, spread throughout a min-
iature golf course, do not make a sound system commercial. 85 The
court rejected the plaintiff's argument that, because the legislative history
stated that the Aiken case "represent[ed] the outer limit of the exemp-
tion," and because the defendant in Aiken used only four speakers, any
system using more than four speakers is commercial.1 86 The court in-
stead determined that "the number of speakers are [sic] not .... standing
alone, the sole or even predominant factors to consider ....
175. Id. at 1330.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1330-31.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991).
181. Id.
182. 617 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
183. Id. at 1023.
184. 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
185. Id. at 1118-19.
186. Id. at 1117-18.
187. Id. More important for the court in Plaza Roller Dome was the low quality of the
speakers at issue. Id. at 1118.
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Hence, uncertainty remains as to how many speakers a sound sys-
tem must have before it becomes more like a commercial system than a
home system.
D. Separation of Receiver and Speakers
Courts also disagree over the importance of separating speakers
from the receiving unit. For some courts, locating the speakers and the
receiver in different rooms amounts to a further transmission in violation
of section 110(5). Such was the case in Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q
Enterprises.8 ' In Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q, each of the defendant's restau-
rants broadcast radio music from a receiver located in a storage closet to
speakers in the dining area.' 89 The court held that such a configuration
provided an independent basis for denying the section 110(5) exemp-
tion.' 90 The court reasoned that "the radio broadcasts... were 'further
transmitted' to the public because the broadcasts were initially received
in a room or area without speakers and were sent to a separate room with
speakers via some 40 feet of wiring."''
A similar conclusion was reached in Hickory Grove Music v. An-
drews.192 As in Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q, the court in Hickory Grove Music
found that the separation of receiver and speakers, by itself, constitutes a
violation of section 110(5). The court argued that, under copyright law,
a transmission occurs whenever images or sounds are received beyond
the place from which they are sent using a process or device. 193 Since the
defendants had admitted listening to the radio while working in the din-
ing rooms, even though the receiver was located in the lobby, the court
concluded that the defendants "further transmitted" radio broadcasts to
the public.
194
Not all courts adopt such reasoning, however. In particular, the
decisions in Claire's Boutiques95 and Edison Bros. 196 cast doubt on the
conclusion that a separation of speakers and receiver constitutes a "fur-
ther transmission" to the public. In Edison Bros., the district court, in
188. 688 F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
189. Id. at 1174.
190. Id. at 1175-76.
191. Id. at 1176.
192. 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990).
193. Id. at 1038.
194. Id. Several other cases also have stressed the importance of separating speakers and
receiver. See, e.g., International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Ill.
1987), afl'd, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988) (section 110(5) exemption denied because receiver
located in defendant's private office connected to speakers in restaurant dining room amounts
to a further transmission).
195. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991).
196. Edison Bros. Stores v. Broadcast Music, Inc. 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir. 1992).
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dicta, openly doubted the validity of analyzing the distance between the
receiver and speakers.197
Similarly, the district court opinion in Claire's Boutiques98 casts
doubt on the importance of separating the speakers from the receiver.
According to the court:
In cases involving ceiling-mounted speakers attached by concealed
wiring, courts have often noted the distance of the speakers from the
receiver. The Court finds that this factor should be considered but is
relatively insignificant .... [T]he area covered by a home-type sound
system is not likely to be significantly affected simply by placing the
speakers at a large distance from the receiver-speakers do not become
louder simply by being placed further from the receiver. Finally, the
Court takes judicial notice that many speakers are sold to private con-
sumers for the express purpose of listening to the radio in a room other
than that in which the receiver is located. 199
E. Quality of the Speakers
Finally, courts differ over the importance of sound and speaker-
quality. In Plaza Roller Dome,2" for example, a sound system spread
across an area twelve times the size of the restaurant in Aiken, and with
more speakers than the restaurant in Aiken, nevertheless fell within sec-
tion 110(5) due to the poor quality of the speakers.2"' The court held
that "the allegedly infringing performances at Defendants' Putt-Putt
course were scarcely audible without distortion even at very close prox-
imity to the speakers. Under such circumstances, the speakers could
scarcely be said to have 'improved the quality of the performance.' "202
The court continued, "[c]learly, the noise level and audibility of songs
transmitted over Defendants' loudspeakers ... does not rise to the level
or minimum quality requisite for a commercial sound system.
' '20 3
Such language suggests the Plaza Roller Dome court determined
that all commercial sound systems, within the context of section 110(5),
possess some minimum level of quality. Moreover, the court implied
that, in reaching the minimum level of quality, a commercial sound sys-
tem must somehow improve the quality of the performance. 2°
At least one court, however, viewed sound quality differently. In
Hickory Grove Music, 20 5 the district court discounted the importance of
197. 760 F. Supp. 767, 771 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
198. 754 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
199. Id. at 1331.
200. Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
201. Id. at 1118.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990).
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sound quality and avoided any requirement that the sound system im-
prove the quality of the performance.2" 6 In finding section 110(5) inap-
plicable to the defendant's restaurant, the court held that "even though
the sound projection from the speakers is not optimal, it is audible to the
public, and the music played is recognizable.' 2 7 The court also argued
that any dispersal of sound from a point of reception throughout a res-
taurant or other establishment is a further transmission.208
Thus, like nearly all of the factors courts evaluate in applying sec-
tion 110(5), the importance of sound quality remains ambiguous.
IV
Recommendation
More than fifteen years after its enactment, section 110(5) remains
shrouded in confusion. Courts vigorously disagree as to whether the ex-
emption is limited to small businesses, and they bicker over the very
meaning of the statute's terms. It is time for Congress to clarify, once
and for all, what section 110(5) is designed to achieve and how it should
be applied.
If, as the legislative history suggests, Congress intended section
110(5) to apply only to small businesses, the statute should say so explic-
itly. If, on the other hand, Congress is fundamentally concerned with
exempting transmissions on home-type equipment, regardless of its own-
ership, then Congress should remove all doubt on the issue. In either
case, Congress could resolve the confusion over which establishments
may use the exemption in just a few sentences.'0 9
Congress should amend section 110(5) and make clear that the ex-
emption is not limited exclusively to small businesses. Such a pro-
nouncement would immediately remove the most nettlesome source of
disagreement among the courts.
Opponents will undoubtedly argue that such a change would vastly
expand the scope of section 110(5) at the expense of copyright owners.' 10
Renouncing an independent size requirement, however, would not ex-
pand the exemption much beyond its current scope for two reasons.
First, section 110(5) would remain limited to the use of home-type equip-
206. Id. at 1038.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. This is not to suggest that Congress should make such a decision without conducting
hearings and debating the merits of either approach. It should be noted, however, that com-
pared to the many overwhelming problems facing Congress, clarification of § 110(5) is a rela-
tively modest undertaking.
210. Before initiating any major changes to § 110(5), Congress should employ the Govern-
ment Accounting Office to estimate the costs of such a change to copyright owners.
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ment.211 Because such equipment is generally incapable of generating
music throughout large areas, section 110(5) will remain unavailable for
many large businesses. Second, section 110(5) forbids further transmis-
sions to the public.212 Courts therefore retain discretion to deny the ex-
emption in situations where music is projected to an excessive number of
listeners.
In addition to rejecting size as an independent requirement of sec-
tion 110(5), Congress should establish firm guidelines under which courts
can interpret and apply the exemption. Congress should, for example,
strictly limit the number of speakers allowed under the exemption.. Ad-
ditionally, Congress should set an upper boundary on how powerful a
sound system may be before losing status as home-type equipment. Both
changes would provide businesses a clear way of knowing when their
sound systems lose the protection of section 110(5) because they are no
longer composed of home-type equipment.
Moreover, Congress should remove concealed wiring and hidden
speakers from the list of significant considerations. The impact of hiding
speaker wire and/or speakers is purely aesthetic and bears no relation-
ship to the number of listeners who will hear copyrighted works. Sound
systems do not become louder when speaker wire is hidden behind a wall.
Consequently, no useful policy objective is served by requiring businesses
to leave speakers and speaker wire exposed in plain view.213 Likewise,
the decision to place the speakers and the receiver in different rooms has
little bearing on the capacity of the sound system to deliver sound over a
large area. By focusing instead on the power of the equipment and the
number of speakers, as opposed to the aesthetics of the sound system,
Congress would better promote the policy goal of preventing transmis-
sions of copyrighted works to large groups of listeners.
Courts must, of course, retain some discretion to balance competing
factors. One clear lesson of the cases to date is that courts rarely encoun-
ter facts identical to those presented in Aiken. Courts therefore need
flexibility to deal with new factual situations as they arise.
An equally important lesson, however, is that the Conference Re-
port's reference to the facts of Aiken as the "outer limit" of the exemp-
tion is a woefully inadequate guideline. The need for predictability
warrants the imposition of some "outer limit" that is specific enough for
211. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).
212. Id.
213. By rejecting the importance of hidden speakers and speaker wires, however, Congress
should not widen § 110(5) to allow businesses to play music over hidden public address sys-
tems. Businesses that convert commercially installed public address systems should remain
unprotected by § 110(5), not because the speakers are hidden in the wall, but because public
address systems are commercial sound systems.
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courts to apply consistently and evenhandedly. By placing a firm ceiling
on both the power of the equipment and the permissible number of
speakers, Congress would give courts the workable "outer limit" they
need.
Absent congressional action, the United States Supreme Court
should settle the division among the circuits and restrain courts from
using legislative history to import a small'business requirement into sec-
tion 110(5). Although section 110(5) is ambiguous in many respects, the
statute unequivocally omits any reference to the size of the establishment
that the exemption is meant to cover. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out
in Claire's Boutiques, legislative history should not be used to invent rules
totally unrelated to the statute.214
Ironically, the muddle surrounding section 110(5), and the small
business requirement in particular, may prove most harmful to small and
medium sized businesses. Unlike large chain stores, such as The Gap,
small business owners are rarely able to afford a court battle with copy-
right licensing organizations. Consequently, few small businesses are
likely to gamble on uncertain case law to defend their right to use the
section 110(5) exemption. By discarding the small business requirement,
and by setting a workable "outer limit" to the section 110(5) exemption,
Congress can reduce the uncertainty of, and the need for, litigation over
section 110(5). With such changes in place, copyright licensing entities
will have clearer grounds for suing infringers, and complying businesses
may safely rely on the exemption to which they are entitled.
214. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1491 (7th Cir. 1991).
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